Titan I 850-A
Squadron: 850th SMS
Date Activated: December 1st 1960
Date Deactivated: March 25th 1965
Air Force Base: Ellsworth
State: South Dakota
Nearest Town: New Underwood
Coordinates:
Latitude: 44° 8'13.72"N
Longitude: 102°37'3.94"W
Decimal:
3 silos
Former Titan I Missile Complex with the 850th Strategic Missile Squadron
Read about the Titan I at Ellsworth AFB
List of all Titan I site Coordinates
Detailed information about the Titan I Intercontinental Ballistic Missile can be found here.
The installation had a short operational life but an unusually rich historical setting. Its construction exposed the difficulty of building first-generation hardened missile plants while the weapon and supporting equipment were still changing. The Ellsworth Titan contract grew from an initial estimate of $47.2 million to $64 million by March 1962 after 265 modifications. Skilled labor shortages, a high turnover rate, brief work stoppages, delayed equipment deliveries, and demanding acceptance procedures affected the three-site field. Site 850-A cannot be assigned every field-wide problem, but it was built within that program and depended on the same design, contractor, and activation system.
The 850th Strategic Missile Squadron entered the national deterrent during a period of rapid change. Ellsworth received nine operational Titan I missiles and had three crews ready on June 22, 1962. Four months later, the Cuban Missile Crisis placed the wing in an advanced state of readiness, and Ellsworth's Titan crews reportedly remained on alert for 72 hours. At the same time, construction of 150 Minuteman launch facilities was transforming the surrounding region. Titan I was removed from alert on January 4, 1965, and the 850th was inactivated on March 25.
Ellsworth's official base guide summarizes the institutional change as the base entering the Space Age with activation of the 850th and the arrival of Titan I missiles in 1962. That broad base narrative agrees with the more detailed construction and unit records while leaving the exact technical-acceptance sequence to those specialized sources.
The former complex entered a lengthy postmilitary period. Federal records say it was excessed to the General Services Administration in August 1965, followed by approximately ten years of salvage, and then conveyed to Lakeside Water. Current U.S. Army Corps of Engineers data identify it as Formerly Used Defense Sites property B08SD0343. Pennington County now identifies a 60.86-acre parcel containing the representative complex point as the property of Lakeside Water Users District. The district is a local-government rural water system. Those records establish ownership and public-water context, but they do not prove that former missile rooms are in use, safe, dry, accessible, or intact.
Official sources apply several names to the same complex. The detailed Department of Defense legacy study calls the three Ellsworth sites New Underwood, Hermosa, and Sturgis. An official Ellsworth historical article calls them Wicksville, Hermosa, and Sturgis. The Corps of Engineers uses Ellsworth AFB Air Force Facility S-1 and property number B08SD0343. Operational shorthand includes 850-A, Site A, Site 1, and Complex 1A.
These names do not describe separate missile complexes. The representative project coordinate, the Corps FUDS point, and the current Pennington County parcel all converge on the same property northeast of Rapid City in the New Underwood area. The small difference between the project and FUDS coordinates is normal for generalized historic-location records. Neither was published as a launcher, entrance, or property-corner survey.
Pennington County reports 60.86 acres. The parcel polygon broadly encloses the recognizable former complex footprint. This current acreage is useful because it comes from the official local land record, but it is not a substitute for the original federal acquisition file. A Titan I property could include the fenced operating compound, fee tracts, access roads, utility corridors, communications routes, restrictive easements, and temporary construction interests. A later parcel may consolidate or omit some of those interests.
The original fee and easement schedule for 850-A was not located. The history therefore does not convert 60.86 acres into an original acquisition figure.
Titan I was developed alongside Atlas as another path to a reliable operational ICBM. The two-stage missile provided greater range and payload than the earliest Atlas versions, but its operating concept still reflected the limitations of first-generation liquid-fueled systems. The missile remained below ground for protection, was loaded with liquid oxygen during a countdown, and was raised to the surface before launch. That sequence required a very large underground plant and exposed the missile during its final preparation.
Dispersal reduced the risk that one attack could eliminate the entire squadron. Ellsworth's nine Titans were divided among three widely separated complexes, each with three launchers, its own control center and power plant, and protected guidance equipment. If one complex were disabled, the other two could remain capable of receiving and executing an authenticated order.
The rural South Dakota setting provided open land and separation, but it also imposed operating costs. Construction materials, specialized workers, missile equipment, liquid oxygen, fuel-system parts, security teams, maintainers, inspectors, food, and ordinary supplies had to reach remote sites over local roads. Reliable power, water, sewage, ventilation, communications, and emergency systems had to be created at each underground complex rather than borrowed from an adjacent base.
The contract began with an estimated value of $47.2 million. By March 1962, it had reached $64 million, a 31 percent increase attributed to 265 modifications. Some changes required contractors to demolish and replace completed work. The figures apply to the Ellsworth field as a whole and cannot be divided evenly among the three complexes, because geology, water, equipment, and corrective work differed by site.
The official synthesis describes a shortage of skilled labor. Workers were brought into the area, turnover was high, and the combined labor force at the three complexes reached about 2,500 at its peak. Labor-management relations were described as amicable. Fifteen work stoppages occurred, most lasting less than a day. A General Electric strike in October 1960 delayed delivery of terminals and affected the completion schedule.
Installing the propellant-loading system proved particularly expensive, as it did at other first-generation missile projects. The history also records a $500,000 groundwater-control problem at Complex 1C. That fact belongs to Site 850-C and is not reassigned to 850-A. Its importance here is comparative: even within one standardized field, local conditions could produce major cost differences.
December 1960 can still describe a major phase of visible construction or the chronology remembered by later unit histories. It should not replace the documented 1959 contract award. The record therefore uses a construction period of 1960 through 1962, preceded by the December 1959 award, rather than claiming an unsupported site-specific groundbreaking day.
This reconciliation matters because Titan and Minuteman construction overlapped. By the time Titan equipment was being installed and tested, Peter Kiewit's Minuteman workforce was excavating and building a far larger field. Later institutional memories could easily merge the two efforts. The correct approach is to preserve each source, explain the conflict, and avoid blending contractor identities.
Standard Titan I engineering records describe three launcher silos placed on separate branches around the central plant. Each launcher branch included an equipment terminal and propellant terminal. The central group included the launch control center, powerhouse, entry portal, and two guidance antenna silos. More than 2,500 feet of corrugated-steel tunnel could connect the facilities, generally buried around 40 feet below the surface.
The launch control center contained command consoles, communications, authentication materials, status displays, crew work areas, and environmental systems. The powerhouse contained diesel generators and distribution equipment intended to keep the complex operating if commercial power failed. The entry portal, blast locks, and protected passages controlled access to the deeper plant.
Each missile stood on a large elevator. Titan I could not launch from underground. After receiving a valid order and completing preparation, the crew opened the launcher doors, raised the fueled missile, and launched from the surface. This basic arrangement is firmly documented for the standard system. No 850-A-specific as-built drawing was located, so the history does not claim that every dimension or later field modification exactly matched the representative HAER record.
Communications tied 850-A to its crew positions, squadron command, Ellsworth support organizations, and national command channels. The exact routing and later modifications of every 850-A circuit were not found. Standard system records show that secure voice, order receipt, status reporting, timing, guidance, alarms, and internal communications formed one integrated network. A failure in power, environmental control, a launcher branch, or guidance equipment could affect readiness even if the missile itself was undamaged.
Command and control depended on authentication and two-person safeguards. Missile crews did not select targets independently. They maintained the site, verified status, responded to higher headquarters, and could act only through controlled procedures. The popular image of a single launch button obscures a complex chain of valid-message receipt, authentication, coordinated actions, system permissives, and physical equipment operation.
The propellant terminals housed equipment needed to move and control fuel and oxidizer. Equipment terminals supported elevators, doors, hydraulic machinery, and launcher services. Piping, valves, pumps, sensors, electrical systems, ventilation, alarms, and emergency procedures had to work together. The result was powerful but maintenance intensive.
Crews conducted recurring checks and propellant-loading exercises. These verified tanks, lines, pumps, valves, sensors, timing, communications, doors, elevators, and emergency responses without turning every exercise into an actual launch. The precise exercise schedule at 850-A was not located, so this history describes the standard duty rather than inventing dates.
Titan I's preparation time and exposed launch position were accepted as an interim capability. Titan II could remain fueled and launch from its silo. Minuteman used solid propellant and a smaller, simpler launch facility. Those advances explain why a field that cost $64 million and demanded years of work could be retired after less than three years of operational service.
Workers required badges. People entering below-ground areas signed in and surrendered smoking materials and other flame-producing items, receiving them back when they signed out. The rules reflected both classification and physical hazards. Construction sites contained fuel-system components, electrical work, heavy equipment, open shafts, lifting operations, welding, confined spaces, and newly installed machinery under test.
By February 1962, much of the equipment was installed and being tested. Hydraulic platforms that raised and lowered the missiles required repeated checks. Air Force Security Police assumed increasing responsibility as the sites moved from contractor control toward operational acceptance.
The surviving sources do not provide a complete 850-A worker roster, shift log, injury ledger, or day-by-day construction diary. They do show that the complex was not a single excavation project. It moved through structural construction, equipment installation, correction, integrated testing, security transition, crew training, missile delivery, and final operational readiness.
This distinction separates completion from readiness. A buried concrete plant could look finished while doors, elevators, generators, guidance electronics, communications, propellant systems, alarms, launch consoles, ventilation, or government-furnished equipment still failed tests. Each subsystem had to work alone and as part of an integrated weapon.
The June 22, 1962 milestone indicates that the 44th received nine operational Titan I missiles and had three crews ready for the mission. It does not prove that every individual acceptance document for 850-A was signed on that exact day.
The 850th controlled maintenance and operations for the nine Titan I missiles. Site 850-A held three launchers and a complete crew station. Sister complexes 850-B and 850-C held the other six launchers. Squadron leadership, maintenance organizations, security forces, transportation, supply, training, and parent-base services linked the separated plants into one operational force.
The missile mission existed alongside Ellsworth's bomber work and the enormous Minuteman buildup. The 44th became the first Minuteman IB wing while still responsible for Titan I. Three Minuteman squadrons and 150 new launch facilities made Ellsworth's missile organization much larger, but Titan provided the immediate ICBM alert force during the transition.
Crew preparation required mastery of nuclear command and control, authentication, emergency actions, liquid-oxygen safety, electrical power, hydraulic equipment, doors, elevators, environmental control, communications, and security. Site-specific crew names and rosters were not located in accessible authoritative records.
In October 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis placed Strategic Air Command in an advanced readiness posture. Ellsworth's Titan crews reportedly remained on alert for 72 hours. The source presents this as an Ellsworth field experience and does not identify a particular complex, crew, or launcher. It is therefore included as squadron context rather than claimed as an exclusive 850-A event.
No operational Titan I was launched from 850-A. Deterrence was the mission: a ready force had value because an adversary had to believe that the missiles could survive long enough to retaliate. Daily success meant maintaining the weapon, communications, power, guidance, crew competence, and command procedures without an accidental or unauthorized launch.
The Titan force occupied a narrow historical window. It was operational early enough to matter during the crisis and obsolete soon enough to disappear before many local residents fully understood its scale. Minuteman's dispersed single-silo system soon became the dominant visual and organizational form of Ellsworth's missile mission.
Rushmore Air Force Station formed another important support link. Built just north of the airbase, Rushmore was a separate, highly secure nuclear-weapons storage and maintenance installation. Historic American Buildings Survey documentation says its administration and operation were largely independent and that it maintained its own housing, warehouse, and shop facilities until formal merger with Ellsworth in 1962.
Building 88247 at the former Rushmore station supported Titan I reentry-vehicle maintenance and training from 1962 to 1964. Extra warheads were stored in the weapons storage area while the launch complexes stood off base. This direct Titan relationship means Rushmore deserves a separate preliminary installation record, not merely a passing mention under Ellsworth. The building was documented by HABS and was demolished after 2012.
The South Dakota Air and Space Museum now preserves an Ellsworth-associated Titan I missile. The artifact arrived from California in 1984, remained in storage for decades, received repairs in 2017, and was prepared for display. It is a legacy object rather than proof that a missile from 850-A survived, and the history does not make that claim.
The difference in cost was striking. The nine Titan launchers cost about $64 million by March 1962. The 150 Minuteman facilities around Ellsworth cost about $75.7 million. The totals do not include every lifecycle expense and should not be treated as a modern purchasing comparison, but they show the construction advantage of smaller standardized facilities and a mature management system.
Minuteman construction also helps explain source confusion. Peter Kiewit and Sons employed thousands of workers across the South Dakota field while Titan activation continued. By April 1963, the first Minuteman missile was emplaced. By October, the wing controlled a fully operational 150-missile force. Titan remained on alert for a time, but its strategic importance was rapidly overtaken.
Site 850-A did not become a Minuteman launch facility. The systems had different layouts, command arrangements, and property requirements. The former Titan plant entered disposal and reuse, while Minuteman continued at Ellsworth until the early 1990s.
The 850th's missiles were removed from alert on January 4, 1965. This is the best supported date for the end of operational readiness. Deactivation required more than turning off consoles. Warheads and missiles had to be removed, classified materials controlled, propellants and hazardous systems addressed, equipment dispositioned, utilities changed, and the property prepared for federal excess and salvage.
The Air Force inactivated the 850th Strategic Missile Squadron on March 25, 1965. The two dates should remain separate. January 4 marks alert withdrawal; March 25 marks organizational inactivation. The preliminary inventory's February 1 close date is not retained because the reviewed official chronology provides stronger controls.
The complex's military career had lasted less than three years from the June 1962 field readiness milestone. Its brief service was not evidence that it failed to matter. Titan I provided an operational bridge from early ICBM experimentation to a much larger and more durable solid-fueled force.
Salvage at a Titan I site could remove machinery, steel, electrical equipment, wiring, piping, doors, reusable components, and other material with resale value. Removal altered the relationship among structural supports, openings, floors, and barriers. A plant described as intact in broad historical terms may still have extensive internal damage or missing systems.
The Corps record does not provide the complete contract sequence, deed date, exact salvage scope, or every protective measure. Pennington County lists May 23, 1988 as the current grantee instrument date. That date is later than the approximate ten-year salvage period and may reflect a later organizational or property transaction rather than the first nonfederal transfer.
The present public record identifies Lakeside Water Users District rather than the private association wording retained in the Corps legacy database. The difference is resolved by treating the Corps ownership label as a historical database description and the current county and state records as authoritative for present status.
The Corps' 2015 South Dakota inventory lists property-level site 00 in the hazardous, toxic, or radioactive waste category and project 01 in the containerized hazardous, toxic, or radioactive waste category. The inventory proves that environmental work was tracked. It does not, by itself, identify every contaminant, sample result, removal volume, institutional control, or current subsurface condition.
Project closeout is an environmental-program status, not a warranty that an abandoned underground missile plant is safe. FUDS addresses eligible Department of Defense contamination. It does not certify structural soundness, remove all hazards created by later owners, establish public access, or replace confined-space and property-law restrictions.
The public records did not yield a full site-specific decision document or sampling report for B08SD0343. The history therefore reports the verified identifiers and status without inventing contaminants. Fuel-system residues, industrial fluids, electrical materials, salvage debris, standing water, structural deterioration, and confined-space hazards are plausible classes of concern at former missile sites, but plausibility is not substituted for a site-specific laboratory result.
The state record establishes that a functioning rural water system exists and that the owner type is local government. It does not show that Titan launchers, tunnels, the control center, or propellant rooms are used for water storage, treatment, or distribution. The history avoids that tempting but unsupported conclusion.
Drinking-water compliance and former-defense-site cleanup answer different questions. Public-water monitoring concerns the quality of water supplied by the system. FUDS status concerns eligible defense-related environmental response. Structural safety concerns the physical condition of a deep underground plant. A favorable record in one category should not be used as proof in another.
The official county parcel and state system record supersede older shorthand that calls the property simply private. They do not create a public right of entry. Local-government ownership can coexist with controlled operations, locked facilities, dangerous structures, and restricted access.
The current county polygon and aerial context preserve the outline of the former military parcel. The surface geometry is consistent with a Titan I complex, but surface imagery alone cannot show underground integrity. Silos may be capped, flooded, modified, partly filled, or obstructed. Tunnels and rooms may contain water, debris, corrosion, altered ventilation, or damaged structural elements.
No current professional structural inspection, interior photographic survey, or public-access program was located.
The property should be treated as a controlled former military site. Coordinates and graphics are provided to explain history, not to guide exploration. Entry without permission may be trespass, and confined underground spaces can be lethal even when they appear stable.
The property-footprint graphic uses the official Pennington County parcel polygon and marks both the project representative point and the Corps FUDS point. It does not place precise launcher centers because a site-specific georeferenced as-built drawing was not obtained. This prevents a generalized schematic from becoming a false modern map.
The field-relationships graphic identifies Ellsworth, 850-A, 850-B, 850-C, and the Rushmore support area without exposing database UIDs to the website reader. The history timeline separates field-level milestones from site-specific property and environmental records. A construction graphic labels its workforce, cost, and modification figures as three-complex field totals.